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MANCHURIAN EMERGENCY

FOREWORD
Having brought forth pamphlets dealing with various
historical aspects of the Manchurian crisis, it has been
-considered advisable to print for purposes of reference
.an English version of the statement given out by the
War Office about the origin and progress of the
unfortunate military clash. What is stated as to the
origin of the trouble confirms and supplements the
.argument advanced on the same subject in the other
publications of ·the present series.
MOTOSADA ZUMOTO

Tokyo, November, 1931.

One of the inspired poste1·s plastered on a wall in
the military barracks at Peitaiying, near M~tkden.
It reads : " K eep a watch at the railway to the
west of our ban·acks."

Srmw of the anti-J apanese posters put on the streets. T he left cut gives a chronological
record of " Chinese P olitical H istory of J apanese Invasion." T he picture on the right
hand side shows Chinese "sweeping national humiliations" out of their lwuse.

A pair of inflammatory posters put up on the street. The pictu?·e on the left side shows
a Korean entering Chinese territory at the point of the Japaese bayonelt. The drawing
on the ?·ight shows the massac1·e of Chinese people by both Japanese and Koreans.

MANCHURIAN EMERGENCY
(Unofficial Translation of Statement Issued by the War Office)

L EVENTS LEADING UP TO IT

The Chinese policy toward Japan is best to be seen
in the light of a series of more than 300 cases or
incident that have featured the intercourse between the
two nations during the past few years. Of the more
recent incidents, mention may be made of the question
of agrement concerning the appointment . of Japanese
minister to China, the maltreatment of Korean farmers
in the region of W anpaosban, mob assaults upon
Japanese population at Tsingtau, and the killing of
Captain Nakamura by Chinese soldiers, all of which are
.still fre h in our minds. In l\Ianchuria alone no less
than a dozen of such incidents have been noted within
a period of but three months after July of this year.
Among these may be noted such cases as the wanton
detention of Japanese patrol soldiers by 50 Chinese police
officers ; Chinese soldiers firing upon Japanese guards
cau ing the loss of a life ; Chinese bandits attacking 5
.Japanese patrol soldiers, killing one of them. In more
than a dozen other cases the Japanese civilian population
were subjected to persecution or humiliation of one sort
or another. Minor cases of open contempt or provocation
in which not only civilians but soldiers of Japan have
figured are almost numberless.
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Such attitude of Chinese mind is to be traced to the
fundamental idea of the "recovery of national rights,"
which has been the keynote of China's foreign policy.
The Three People's Principles of the late Sun Yat-sen,
the abrogation .of unequal treaties as expounded by the
Kuomintang and the general anti-Imperialistic sentiment
form the basis upon which the whole Chinese mentality, .
official and individual, bas in recent years been shaped.
All institutions of learning, from colleges- down to
elementary schools, employ text-books carrying expressions
of contempt or hostility to Japan, or verses of the same
tenor which young scholars are taught to sing. Military
institutions overlook no opportunity to spread the same
feeling in the ranks. An extreme instance in the case
was seen when the soldiers at drill, ordered to number
off, gave an expression for "Down with Japan I " instead
of numbers. This is certainly a form of military training
with Japan as China's national enemy.
In the field of civil administration, likewise, the
National Government has been responsible for a number
of legislative and other acts plainly aimed against Japan.
Existing treaty commitments have often been ignored.
Attempts have been made to nullify existing agreements
with Japan, by purposely evading the issues on the
pretext of internal troubles. To the end of nullifying
the agreement as to the question of land lease in Manchuria, the Chinese authorities have issued laws whereby
any one leasing land to a Japanese may be declared aa
punishable by death, and no mortgage held by a
Japanese subject is to receive official recognition.
Orders have also been issued to cancel all contracts with
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Japanese people for lease of houses. A special Commission has been organized on the professed ground of
guarding against "unpatriotic sales of land." In open
violation of the treaties, the governors of provinces have
been ordered to stop trading in Japanese goods. Japanese subjects have been refused official permits for inland
travels. No opportunity has been suffered to pass without being turned to the furtherance of the anti-Japanese cause. This sentiment of hostility is now reflected
even in the address which common Chinese people adopt
in daily conversations with Japanese. Where a Japanese
was once addressed with all respect due to a person of
social respectability is now often addressed in the low
jargon of the street.
Nor does the same spirit fail to display itself among
Chinese officials.
Dr. Wang Chen-ting, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, speaking before Kuomintang members
at Nanking in February of this year, was reported to
have openly expressed himself to the effect that, should
Japan oppose Chinese recovery of national rights, all
that China had to do would be to settle the matter by
the grim methods of war. Again, on another public
occasion last August, the same Chinese statesman boldly
discussed possibilities of driving Japanese population out
of Manchuria by warlike methods.
Chinese officials,
military and others, have of late spoken muGh about the
superiority of their soldiers, pointing out the actual
training and abundant experience they have acquired on
the field of battle. They have always referred in a
contemptuous vein to the Japanese soldiers as men without experience of actual warfare. Such remarks, because

often heard not ronly in military but also other official
quarters, gained wide currency. 'rhe anti-Japanese attitude
of a negative character was thus gradually turned into
one of open contempt and defiance. When such a spirit
was openly encouraged and was so widely at work, it
was unavoidable that a dangerous situation should be
precipitated.
Several days before the hostilities broke out in Manchuria, General Wang I-che, Commander of the Chinese
Brigade at Peitaiying, wbi~h was to become the centre
of military operations in the present Mukden Qampaign,
was quoted as having said in the course of a speech on
the Manchurian situation, that he would be proud to
follow the example of General Han Kwang-yung, who
was the author of the Sino-Soviet hostilities of 1930,
dying on the field of battle. There were current at the
time among the Chinese population rumours of " an
imminent expulsion of the Japanese influence" and
frequent talks of the " approach of hostilities to be
launched by Chinese troops in South Manchuria."
All this by way of showing the attitude of provacative
hostility that the Chinese people had been showing in
China in general, and in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia
in particular, wherever they came in touch with Japanese interests. It was inevitable, under the circumstances,
that both the Chinese and Japanese people should come
to confront one another with a sharpened sense of antagonism. Fear of an outbreak of some sort had been fast
growing in many quarters, when the attack of Chinese
soldiers on the South Manchuria Railway near Mukden
at last threw fat intq the long smouldering fire.
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Col. Doihara, who was for a time in charge of civil administration in Mukden_..
organized a medical clinic to administer help to the native
civilians abandoned in their sick-beds.

Almost at the first shot fired, Chinese physicians fled dese1·ting their patients
in hospital. These civilian patients were 1·emoved to the Japan
R ed Cross H ospital at the first opportunity.

The scarcity of foodstu.tfs became one of the first pressing questions after hostilities ceased
in M ukden. Col. D oiha1·a arranged with religious organizations for free
distribution of foodstuffs among the poorer classes of Chinese.
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II. OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

What gave rise to hostilities near Mukden, wa an
incident in itself very simple. On the night of eptember 18 about 10.30 p.m., two or three companies of
Chinese soldiers, under direction of a Chinese officer,
destroyed the track of the South Manchuria Railway at
a point to the southwest of the C_hinese military barracks
at Peitaiying where some 7,000 of soldiers were quartered
under command of General Wang, Commander of the
Brigade. These soldiers, having opened fire upon the
Japanese soldiers who happened to be patroling the railway, proceeded toward Liutianghu where a Japanese detachment was statioued. Upon the report of this, a company
of Japanese railway guards at the Hushihtai hastened to
the aid, following the railway line to the south. The
Chinese soldiers retired into the barracks at Peitaiying
from the southwest side. The Japanese soldiers in pursuit pushed their way to get into the barracks from the
same direction until they were brought to a sharp stop
by a strong fire directed from inside the barracks. The
Japanese company, having occupied a corner on the
barrack grounds, opposed the Chinese soldiers who were
soon reinforced by machine guns, infantry and artillery.
Consequently, the Japanese found themselves in difficulty,
Lieutenant Noda falling in the action, until a reinforcement from the Second Battalion of Rail way Guards at
Mukden arrived under command of Lieut.-Colonel Shimamoto. These combined forces drove the Chinese soldiers
out of Peitaiying toward the daybreak. Inside the
banacks large quantities of cartridges and hand grenades
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were discovered lying about almost evefY\Vhere. This is
a significant circumstance, because it is a rule in the
Chinese army never to supply men with these things
except at time of ·war . .
The 29th Regiment of Japanese Infantry under command of Colonel Hirata stationed in the railway zone
near Mukden, and in proximity with the Chinese troops
stationed thereabout to .the number of some 14,000 men,
was naturally apprised of the above incident with little
delay. The Regiment was at once put into action
against the Chinese troops within the walled city of
Mukden.
Lieut.-General Tamon, Commander of the Second
Division stationed at Liaoyang, issued an order at 1 a.m.
for a concentration of the main force near Mukden.
(Note : The Chinese troops under Marshal Chang
Hsueh-liang numbered 330,000, consisting of 250,000
regulars and 80,000 irregulars. Of these men 110,000
were away on an expedition beyond Shanhaikwan.
The remaining force of 220,000, equipped with
some 216 pieces of artillery, was stationed in
Manchuria, the regions about the city of Mukden
being guarded by some 14,000 men with about 40
pieces of artillery. At ordinary times the Chinese
garrison within the walled city of Mukden is 3,000
strong.)
Against this force, the Japanese troops in Manchuria
were in all not more than 10,400 in number. This force
consisted of one division of about 5,400 strong, 16 pieces
of artillery, and the Independent Railway Garrison
of about 5,000, whereas the number of Japanese troops
sanctioned by treaty is about 17,000. The duty of the
Japanese military force in Manchuria is to guard the
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leased Province of Kwantung and the South Manchuria
Railway, extending over a distance of 1,100 kilometres.
In performing their duties, they have the right to resort
to military action in case of necessity. The safeguarding
of some 200,000 Japanese subjects and 800,000 Koreans
also must by necessity rec~ve their attention.
Although the Japanese force on such a basis is quite
adequate to deal with the bandits for whom Manchuria
is notorious, they had quite a different proposition in
taking action against the regular Chinese troops of
decided numerical superiority. The situation of so
precarious and perplexing a nature perforce demanded
prompt action all along the line. No longer left in
doubt as to the situation as regards the hostilities
between the two sides, the Japanese military promptly
rose to the occasion by concentrating the scattered troops
at strategic points and by launching counter attacks
wherever possible. Far outnumbered, it was tactical
necessity for the Japanese force first to sweep off the
Chinese troops in close prox~mity and next to station
themselves at such points as to secure an open field for
free manoeuvres. It is natural that the Japanese military,
well alive to their own situation, should always have on
hand plans carefully worked out on such principle.
The main force of the 2nd Division at Liaoyang,
largely consisting of the 16th Regiment of Infantry, was
immediately set in motion and arrived at Mukden early
in the morning of the 19th. They proceeded at once to
the district on the east side of the walls. By 8 a.m. or
thereabout the Chinese troops had completely been swept
off that part of the town. Later joined by the Regiment
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of Artillery (4 companies with 16 pieces of ordnance)
from Haicheng, the main force of the 2nd Division
turned upon the Chinese soldiers at Tungtaiying (about
2 miles to the northwest of Mukden), completely driving
them off by 2.30 p.m.
Lieutenant-General Honjo, Commander of the K wantung Military Force, in view of incoming reports, decided
to send forth his main force to Mukden to assist in the
campaign there. At 3 a.m. on October 19, he set out
from Port Arthur for Mukden, requesting at the same
time the Second Squadron of the Imperial Navy in port
there to dispatch a part of its force to Yingkow for the
protection of the Japanese there, and also sending a call
to Korea for dispatch of reinforcements.
Lieutenant-General Honjyo, arriving at Mukden at
noon on the 19th, placed a section of the guard force
at Tungtaiying, while the gendarmerie, with the support
of an infantry contingent, were put on guard within the
walled city. The main force was then concentrated
within the railway zone near by.
In the meantime in the direction of Changchun, the
4th Regiment of Japanese infantry under Colonel Nagashima, found itself placed within a line of Chinese
military force about 10,000 strong, armed with about
40 pieces of artillery. This Japanese force, as a step in
self-defence, began to direct its action against the Chinese
contingent at Nanling with the object of clearing out
their base at Kwanchengtze. The Japanese met with
strong resistance in that direction, but with the assistance of the First Battalion of the Independent Railway
Garrison, they were able to drive off the Chinese from
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Kwanchengtze after a long action, at about 11 a.m.
and from Nanling about 3 p.m. With these points
secured, the northern approach to the South Manchuria
Railway line was practically closed to attack.
Chinese Treachery at Nanling

In the course of engagement at Nanling, the Chinese
treacherously hoisted several white flags and drew the
unsuspecting Japanese within 40 or 50 metres, when
they opened fire, causing heavy damage to the advancing
party.
The casualties on the Japanese side in the fights at
the above mentioned places were as follows : KILLED

WOUNDED

Non-eom.
Officers officers &
private!'

Mukden & vicinity
Changchun & vicinity.

0
3

Total ..................

3

2

Non-rom.
Officers officer.; &
privates

19

63

7
3

65

10

92

73

III. SITUATION AFTER SEPTEMBER 20

On September 20 the main portion of the 30th
Regiment of Infantry and a battalion of field artillery
arrived at Ch~tngchun from Port Arthur and Haicheng
respectivelY. The Commander of the 2nd Division also
moved his headquaTters to Changchun the same day to
reinforce the line in that direction.
In the city of !Grin general conditions began to show
signs of restlessness among the Chinese soon after the
outbreak of hostilities at Mukden. Stones began to be
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thrown upon houses occupied by Japanese. Persistent
I
calls for protection began to come from the Japanese
I
residents there, of whom there were more than 900.
I
There also came the report of the Kirin army moving
westward against the Japanese troops. For protection of I
the South Manchuria Railway on its flank and of the I
Japanese population in Kirin, therefore, the Commander 1
of the 2nd Division organized a mixed brigade and I
despatched it to the same city at about 10 a. m. I
September 21 by the Kirin-Changchun Railway. This I
manoeuvre removed a considerable portion of the force I
out of Changchun, but the thinned ranks were strengthened I
in the following afternoon by the arrival of the 15th I
Brigade of Infantry from Mukden.
I
Situation along the Line

1
1

In Kirin the Chinese soldiers were evidently thrown 1
into panic at the advance of the Japanese troops. As a I
result of the parleys which General Hsi Ha, chief of the I
staff, came out to conduct, the Japanese entered the
city almost without any hostilities about 6 p. m., while
the Chinese troops retreated to a distance of 20 Chinese
miles (approximately 8 English miles). The 2nd Divi- I
sion, having secured order in this part, again moved
1
its main body of men back to Changchun to strengthen I
the force there.
In the region of Chientao (Kanto) near the northern I
frontier of Korea, reports of the military clash in Mukden I
at once began to agitate the Chinese element, until an I
uprising took place on the 20th. At Lungtsingtsun the I
Chinese rabble went so far as to set fire to the engine- I

I
I
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shed at the railway station. At Yenki a public school
was destroyed by fire. Though the socialists are charged
with these actions, a state of panic prevails throughout
these regions. There are persistent rumours of impending
massacre by Chinese. The Japanese and Korean population has been sending out repeatOO calls to the Commander of the Japanese Army in Korea, though such
action bas been withheld to date. .
The situation in Harbin has been no better, where
the Japanese population numbers about 4,000. On the
night of September 20 printed sheets were distributed in
the city to stir up anti-Japanese propaganda. The next
morning the local Japane e organized a volunteer militia
for self defence. Urgent calls began to come from these
Japanese and from the acting Consul-General there. On
the night of September 21 about 9 p.m. bombs were
thrown at our Consulate-General, the Bank of Chosen
and a daily newspaper office.
Although the Japanese residents not only in Harbin
but elsewhere, find themselves under conditions of extreme difficulty and danger, the Japanese Government, ·
desiring to localize the troubles, has decided not to send
military force beyond the present line. In other words,
the Japanese residents are to be called back in case of
necessity.
In the meantime, in the city of Mukden, which was
completely deserted by all Chinese authorities soon after
the fight, the Japanese military took temporary measures
for maintenance of order. However, with the gradual
return of peape, the conditions are being restored to
what they were before. It is noteworthy that the
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Chinese populace, who had always been victimized by
Chinese military and other authorities, have found under
Japanese guardi~tnship such a peaceful order of things as
never seen before. Signs of peaceful restoration began
to be seen the second day after the entry of the Japanese. On September 21 many shops and commercial
establishments began to open, with the financial mark t
again in operation.
As for the Army in Korea, a mixed brigade of some
2,900 men was organized under Major-General Yo himara and concentrated at hingishu on September 19 at
10 a.m., and held in readines to proceed to places to
be garrisoned. At the same time two companies were
sent out for advance reconnaissance and other duties.
When the Kwantung Force had advanced to Kirin,
the Commander of the forces at Shingishu, in view of
the pressing situation, moved his troop , upon his ·own
initiative, across the Yalu on September 21 at 1.20 p.m .
to reinforce the Kwantung force. Arriving at Iukden
about midnight, it replaced the main force of the 2nd
Division, detailing out detachments to Chengtiatun and
Shinmin the next day.
IV. DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE TROOPS

As a result of the military action and manoeuvres
described above, hostilities practically came to a close.
However, disbanded Chinese soldiers and bandits still
continue to be active in the zone of the South Manchuria
Railway, causing no small casualties on our side. There
are indications of growing activity on their part.
As for the interior parts of the country, there is no·
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means of obtaining information. However, there is
reason to think that considerable numbers of Korean
settlers have been massacred.
The disposition of the Japanese troops, as it stood at
the beginning of October, is as given below, with little
subsequent changes :
In Mukden regi ons

Headquarters of Kwantung Forces.
The 39th Mixed Brigade.
A part of this force is posted on guard at the railway bridge at Liaoho, east of hinmin.
In Ohangchun 1·egions
Main force of the 2nd Division.
A part of this force is dispatched to guard Chengtiatun and neighbouring regions.
In Kirin regions
A part of the 2nd Division.
In addition to these, the Independent Railway Garrison
attends to the guarding of the South Manchuria Railway,
with its headquarters at Ssupingkai.
A glance at the map of Manchuria will show that
Kirin is a point of great importance as a northern
approach to the South Manchuria Railway, whence much
damage might be inflicted. Chengtiatun and Shinmin
are points through which the Chinese would have to pass
in order to attack the same railway from the western side.
The presence of the Japanese troops between these two
poin ts, therefore, is a matter of absolute necessity for
safeguarding the same railway, and signifies neither
military occupation nor permanent disposition of troops.

14 V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
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From the above review, it may be seen that the
present Japanese military action in Manchuria began a.s
an act strictly in self-defence. The general situation
there made it necessary for the Japanese to extend such
action to points essential for self protection. Promptness
of action ie the first essential in moving small forces
against forces of numerical superiority. Failure to forestall would be fatal to a force fighting against great
numerical odds, a fact to which the Japanese bad to be
fully awake to assure their own success. Especially so
wl1en the Japanese bad to operate with small troops
scattered over regions three times wider than Japan
Proper.

APPENDIX
Statement by Imperial Government

The Imperial Government, in order to make clear its
position as to the Manchurian question, issued on September 24 the following statement :" (1) The Japanese Government has constantly been
exercising honest endeavours, in pursuance of its settled
policy, to foster friendly relations between Japan and
China and to promote jJ:J.e common prosperity and wellbeing of the two countries. Unfortunately, the conduct
of officials and individuals of China for some years past
has been such that our national sentiment has frequently
been irritated. In particular, unpleasant incidents have
taken place one after another in the regions of Manchuria and Mongolia, in which Japan is interested in
an especial degree, until the impression has gained
strength in the minds of the Japanese people that
Japan's fair and friendly attitude is not being reciprocated
by China in a like spirit. Amidst an atmosphere of
perturbation and anxiety thus created, a detachment of
Chinese troops destroyed the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway in the vicinity of Mukden and attacked
our railway guards at midnight on September 18; a
clash between the Japanese and Chinese troops then
took place.
" (2) The situation became critical, as the number
of the Japanese guards stationed along the entire railway
did not then exceed 10,400, while there were in juxta-.

16
position some 220,000 Chinese soldiers.
Moreover,
hundreds of thousands of Japanese residents were placed
in jeopardy. In order to forestall an imminent disaster,
the Japanese army had to act swiftly. Chinese soldiers
garrisoned in the neighbouring localities were disarmed
and the duty of maintaining peace and order wa left
in the hands of the local Chinese organizations under
the supervision of Japanese troops.
"(3) These measures having been taken, our soldiers
were mostly withdrawn within the railway zone. There
still remain some detachments in Mukden and Kirin and
a small number of men in a few other places, but nowhere does a state of military occupation, as such, exist.
The reports that Japanese authorities have seized the
customs of the salt gabelle office at Yingkou, or that they
have taken control of the Chinese railways between
Ssupingkai and Chengchiatun or between Mukden and
Shinmintun are entirely untrue, nor has the story of our
troops having ever been sent north of Changchun or into
Chientao any foundation in fact.
" (4) The Japanese Government, at the special
Cabinet meeting of September 19, took the decision that
all possible efforts should be made to prevent the aggravation of the situation, and instructions to that effect
were given to tho Commander of tho Manchurian
Garrison. It is true that a detachment was despatched
from Cbangchun to Kirin on September 21, but it was
not with a view to military occupation but only for the
purpose of removing a menace to tho South Manchuria
Railway on its flank. As soon as that object has be n
attained, the bulk of our detachment will be withdrawn.
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It may be added that while a mixed brigade of 4,000
men was sent from Korea to join the Manchurian garrison, the total number of men in the garrison at present
still remains within the limit set by treaty, and that
fact cannot therefore be regarded as having in any way
added to the seriousness of international situation.
"(5) It Hlay be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbours no territorial designs in
Manchuria. What we desire is that Japanese subjects
shall be enabled safely to engage in various peaceful
pursuits and be given the opportunity of participating
in the development of that land by means of capital and
labour. It is the proper duty of a government •to
protect rights and interests legitimately enjoyed by the
nation or individuals. The endeavours of the Japanese
Government to guard the South Manchuria Railway
against wanton attacks should be viewed in no other
light. The Japanese Government, true to its established
policy, is prepared to co-operate with the Chinese Government in order to prevent the present incident from
developing into a disastrous situation between the two
countries and to work out such constructive plans as
will once for all eradicate cause for future friction. The
Japanese Government would be more than gratified if
the present difficulty could be brought to a solution
which will give a new turn to the mutual relations of
the two countries."
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